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Howard and Rich: A History of Miranda and Why It Remains Vital Today

A HISTORY OF MIRANDA AND WHY IT
REMAINS VITAL TODAY*
Roscoe C. Howard, Jr.†
Lisa A. Rich‡
Today, anyone with a television can turn it on—at any time of day or
night—and find a police officer informing a criminal of his or her
Miranda rights.1 And as they sit in their comfortable chairs, beverages in
hand, they can probably recite along with the police officer, “You have the
right to remain silent. . . .”
Custodial interrogations and how they are conducted in light of
Miranda and its progeny are an integral part of the American criminal
justice process and a necessary tool for criminal law enforcement, not
merely a source of catchy phrases for today’s popular television shows,
for a very simple reason: The warnings set the ground rules for
custodial interrogations and ensure that the interrogator and suspect are
on a level playing field. A review of the case law surrounding the
Miranda decision reveals that Miranda is a case that has encapsulated the
nation’s beliefs and, while subject to the ebbs and flows that come with
an elastic and accommodating form of government, remains a vital
component of the American criminal justice system.
I. STATE OF THE WORLD BEFORE MIRANDA
While Miranda has become a fundamental part of criminal justice
jurisprudence, the Court was not covering novel ground.2 The Supreme
Court had considered issues concerning custodial interrogations and,
more importantly, confessions for decades leading up to the Court’s
*
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criminal justice process. This Article represents an expansion of those remarks.
†
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1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2
Id. at 442. “We start here, as we did in Escobedo, with the premise that our holding is
not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an application of principles long recognized
and applied in other settings.” Id.
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opinion in Miranda. For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”) routinely gave Miranda-type warnings before they were required
under Miranda.3 And it was those warnings upon which the Miranda
Court based its holdings.4 As outlined for the Miranda Court, the FBI’s
warnings preceded custodial interrogation and informed the subject both
of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel.5
American jurisprudence regarding the admissibility of confessions
prior to the mid-1960s was based primarily on establishing the
“voluntariness” of the confession.6 Over time, the Court recognized two
constitutional bases for requiring only voluntary confessions to be
admitted as evidence:
the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.7 Some thirty opinions were issued by the Court applying
the due process voluntariness test prior to 1964, and those cases refined

3

Id. at 483.
Over the years the Federal Bureau of Investigation has compiled an
exemplary record of effective law enforcement while advising any
suspect or arrested person, at the outset of an interview, that he is not
required to make a statement, that any statement may be used against
him in court, that the individual may obtain the services of an attorney
of his own choice and, more recently, that he has a right to free counsel
if he is unable to pay.

Id.
4

Id. at 484.
“‘The standard warning long given by Special Agents of the FBI to
both suspects and persons under arrest is that the person has a right to
say nothing and a right to counsel, and that any statement he does
make may be used against him in court. Examples of this warning are
to be found in the Westover case at 342 F.2d 684 (1965), and Jackson v.
U.S., [119 U.S.App.D.C. 100] 337 F.2d 136 (1964), cert. den., 380 U.S.
935, 85 S. Ct. 1353.’”

Id.
Id. at 483. The FBI noted for the Court that although the timing of the warning had to
precede the interview, it could take place in a continuum from as soon as practicable after
the arrest up to the commencement of an interview. Id. at 485. “‘The FBI warning is given
to a suspect at the very outset of the interview.’” Id.; see Westover v. United States, 342 F.2d
684 (1965). “‘The warning may be given to a person arrested as soon as practicable after the
arrest, . . . but in any event it must precede the interview with the person for a confession or
admission of his own guilt.’” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 485; see Jackson v. United States, 337 F.2d
136 (1964); see also United States v. Konigsberg, 336 F.2d 844 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933
(1964).
6
See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433–34 (2000) (noting reliance on due
process analysis for admission of confessions).
7
Id. at 433.
5
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the test into an inquiry that examined whether a defendant’s will was
overborne by the circumstances surrounding the confession.8
As the Court later noted, these cases did not offer a “talismanic”
definition of “voluntariness” that would be mechanically applicable to
the host of situations where the question has arisen.9
Rather, “voluntariness” has reflected an accommodation
of the complex [set] of values implicated in the police
questioning of a suspect. At one end of the spectrum is
the acknowledged need for police questioning as a tool
for the effective enforcement of criminal laws. . . . At the
other end of the spectrum is the set of values reflecting
society’s deeply felt belief that criminal law cannot be
used as an instrument of unfairness, and that the
possibility of unfair and even brutal police tactics poses
a real and serious threat to civilized notions of justice.10
Therefore, voluntariness was an examination of the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the defendant’s confession.11
“The
determination ‘depend[s] upon a weighing of the circumstances of
pressure against the power of resistance of the person confessing.’”12
Throughout the 1960s the Court “changed the focus of much of the
inquiry” from the due process “totality of the circumstances” approach
to an “inquiry in determining the admissibility of suspects’ incriminating
statements.”13 Beginning with its decision in Malloy v. Hogan,14 the Court
8
Id. at 433–34 (citing Schneckcloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223 (1973)); see also
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321 n.2 (1959) (citing twenty-eight cases decided between
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), and Escobedo that dealt with “voluntariness” in
confessions).
9
Schneckcloth, 412 U.S. at 224.
10
Id. at 224–25.
11
Id. at 225. “In determining whether a defendant’s will was overborne in a particular
case, the Court has assessed the totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both the
characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.” Id. at 226. The
Schneckcloth Court identified several factors that courts had looked at to determine
voluntariness including:
[T]he youth of the accused; his lack of education; or his low
intelligence; the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional
rights; the length of detention; the repeated and prolonged nature of
the questioning; and the use of physical punishment such as the
deprivation of food or sleep.
Id. (citations omitted).
12
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434 (citing Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 185 (1953)).
13
Id.
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switched to a Fifth Amendment analysis, finding that “the Fifth
Amendment’s Self Incrimination Clause is incorporated into the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and this applies to the
States.”15
Today the admissibility of a confession in a state criminal
prosecution is tested by the same standard applied in federal
prosecutions since 1897 when, in Bram v. United States,16 the Court held
that “[i]n criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, wherever a
question arises whether a confession is incompetent because not
voluntary, the issue is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States, commanding that no person
‘shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.’”17
Under this test, the constitutional inquiry is not whether the conduct
of state officers in obtaining the confession was shocking, but whether
the confession was free and voluntary; that is, “‘[it] must not be extracted
by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied
promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper
influence. . . .’”18 Two weeks after the Malloy decision, the Court
outlined the fundamental principles that would become the backbone of
its Miranda decision. In Escobedo v. Illinois,19 the Court addressed “certain
phases” of the “restraints society must observe consistent with the
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
Id. at 1. In Malloy, the Supreme Court was asked to review its decisions in two prior
cases in which it had declined to extend Fifth Amendment privilege to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. “We hold today that the Fifth Amendment’s exception
from compulsory self-incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
against abridgment by the States. Decisions of the Court since Twining and Adamson have
departed from the contrary view expressed in those cases.” Id. at 6.
16
Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). The Bram Court attempted to set limits for
interrogation resulting in confessions:
[I]n order to be admissible, [a confession] must be free and voluntary:
that is, must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor
obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the
exertion of any improper influence. . . . A confession can never be
received in evidence where the prisoner has been influenced by any
threat or promise; for the law cannot measure the force of the influence
used, or decide upon its effect upon the mind of the prisoner, and
therefore excludes the declaration if any degree of influence has been
exerted.
Id. at 542–43 (citing 3 RUSSELL ON CRIMES 478 (6th ed. 1896)).
17
Bram, 168 U.S. at 542.
18
Malloy, 378 U.S. at 7 (citing Bram, 168 U.S. at 542).
19
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
14
15
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Federal Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crime.”20 As would
eventually be the case with the defendants in Miranda, the defendant in
Escobedo was taken into custody and interrogated for four hours for the
purpose of gaining a confession without the notice of his right to remain
silent or his right to have counsel present.21 The Escobedo Court
considered whether, under the circumstances presented:
[T]he refusal by the police to honor petitioner’s request
to consult with his lawyer during the course of an
interrogation constitutes a denial of “the Assistance of
Counsel” in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution as “made obligatory upon the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment,” Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 342, 83 S. Ct. 792, 795, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, and
thereby renders inadmissible in a state criminal trial any
incriminating statement elicited by the police during the
interrogation.22
The Court concluded that “when the process shifts from
investigatory to accusatory—when its focus is on the accused and its
purpose is to elicit a confession—our adversary system begins to
operate, and, under the circumstances here, the accused must be
permitted to consult with his lawyer.”23 The Court went on to hold that
“[t]here is necessarily a direct relationship between the importance of a
stage to the police in their quest for a confession and the criticalness of
that stage to the accused in his need for legal advice. Our Constitution,
unlike some others, strikes the balance in favor of the right of the
accused to be advised by his lawyer of his privilege against selfincrimination.”24 Thus, the Escobedo Court affirmed a suspect’s Sixth
Amendment right to counsel during in-custody interrogations, and that
one’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applied to
in-custody interrogations.25 The Court also concluded that the law
enforcement involved in the Escobedo case were unconstitutionally
overbearing.26

20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439–40 (1966).
Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 485.
Id. at 479.
Id. at 492.
Id. at 488.
Id. at 490–91.
Id. at 490.
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The Escobedo ruling sent ripples throughout the state and federal law
enforcement communities. In order to address the Escobedo holding, law
enforcement employed various haphazard methods to indicate that
confessions were garnered in accordance with the principles set forth in
the case. In Arizona, confessions included a typed statement indicating
that a suspect had waived his rights at the time of confessing. It is the
bureaucratic rubber-stamp waiver that ultimately would be at issue in
Miranda. The Court took up four consolidated cases to allow it “to give
concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and
courts to follow” in the wake of Escobedo.27
II. A REVIEW OF MIRANDA AND ITS HOLDINGS
Miranda v. Arizona28 was a consolidated decision based on four cases,
three state cases and one federal, which involved custodial
interrogations.29
In all four cases, the questioning elicited oral
admissions, and in three of the cases the defendants submitted signed
confessions. These confessions were admitted at the defendants’ trials
resulting in their subsequent convictions. All but one of the verdicts was
upheld on appeal.30
Of the four defendants, Ernesto Miranda
(“Miranda”) has become the most famous, as his case was the one which
the Warren majority used to demonstrate why its holding was necessary.
A. The Facts of Miranda’s Case
Each of the four cases addressed in the Supreme Court’s Miranda
opinion involved confessions obtained from the defendant under
circumstances that did not meet constitutional standards for the
protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege.31 The facts surrounding
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441–42 (1966).
See generally id.
29
Miranda was consolidated with Vignera v. New York, on certiorari to the Court of
Appeals of New York, and Westover v. United States, on certiorari to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, both argued from February 28 to March 1, 1966, as well as
California v. Stewart, on certiorari to the Supreme Court of California, argued from February
28 to March 2, 1966. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436.
30
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 518.
31
Id. at 491. Each of the four cases consolidated into Miranda were reversed. In Vignera
v. New York, the Court concluded that the defendant’s oral admission to a robbery for
which he subsequently was convicted was obtained without any warnings as to his rights.
Additionally, the trial judge disallowed defense counsel from raising the issue and
counseled the jury that failure to give warnings did not invalidate a confession. Id. at 493–
94. In Westover v. United States, the defendant was arrested by local authorities who
subsequently learned from the FBI that he was wanted in another state. Id. at 494. Local
police interrogated him on the night of his arrest and through the next morning. Id. at 494–
95. Local police terminated their interrogation and turned the defendant over to the FBI.
27
28
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Miranda’s arrest, confession, and subsequent conviction represent the
typical case the Court hoped to address with its decision.
In March of 1963, a young woman was kidnapped and raped in the
desert outside of Phoenix, Arizona.32 About ten days later, Miranda, an
indigent Mexican who had dropped out of school in the ninth grade, was
arrested at his home and taken into custody by the Phoenix police.33 The
young woman identified Miranda as her attacker, and afterwards
Miranda was taken into an interrogation room and interrogated by
police officers for two hours.34 Miranda did not have counsel during this
custodial interrogation.35
At the end of the two hours, the two officers emerged with a written
confession signed by Miranda.36 At the top of the confession was a typed
paragraph “stating that the confession was made voluntarily, without
threats or promises of immunity and ‘with full knowledge of my legal
rights, understanding any statement I make may be used against me.’”37
Miranda’s confession was admitted at trial over objection of his counsel.
After Miranda’s conviction, he was sentenced to a term of twenty to
thirty years on each count.38

Id. at 495. Nothing in the record indicated that the defendant was warned of his rights by
local police. Id. The FBI gave their standard warnings, but at that point the defendant had
been in custody for over fourteen hours and his confession shortly after the FBI’s arrival
was deemed by the Court to be a continuation of the local interrogation with warnings
coming at the end of the process. Id. at 496. The Supreme Court reversed Westover’s
conviction because the surrounding circumstances did not lead to an assumption that an
intelligent waiver of constitutional rights had been given. Id. In California v. Stewart, the
Court affirmed the California Supreme Court’s application of Escobedo to Stewart’s
confession that came during the ninth interrogation session in a five-day period. Id. at 497.
During the previous eight sessions, Stewart had maintained his innocence. Id. Nothing in
the record indicated that Stewart had ever been advised of his rights. Id.
In dealing with custodial interrogation, we will not presume that a
defendant has been effectively apprised of his rights and that his
privilege against self incrimination has been adequately safeguarded
on a record that does not show that any warnings have been given or
that any effective alternative has been employed. Nor can a knowing
and intelligent waiver of these rights be assumed on a silent record.
Id. at 498–99.
32
Id. at 518.
33
Id. at 492, 518. Psychological tests would later determine that Miranda suffered from
mental conditions, including sexual fantasies. Id. at 518.
34
Id. at 491–92.
35
Id. at 492.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
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Upon review, the Supreme Court determined that the testimony of
the police officers at Miranda’s trial and the government’s response brief
made clear that Miranda had not been in “any way apprised of his right
to consult with an attorney and to have one present during the
interrogation, nor was his right not to be compelled to incriminate
himself effectively protected in any other manner.”39 “The mere fact that
he signed a statement which contained a typed-in clause stating that he
had ‘full knowledge’ of his ‘legal rights’ does not approach the knowing
and intelligent waiver required to relinquish constitutional rights.”40
B. Holding
The Miranda Court recognized that its holding may be seen as a
departure from the due process analysis that had been the norm in cases
leading up to the Malloy and Escobedo cases:
In these cases, we might not find the defendants’
statements to have been involuntary in traditional terms.
Our concern for adequate safeguards to protect precious
Fifth Amendment rights is, of course, not lessened in the
slightest. . . . To be sure, the records do not evince overt
physical coercion or patent psychological ploys. The fact
remains that in none of these cases did the officers
undertake to afford appropriate safeguards at the outset
of the interrogation to insure that the statements were
truly the product of free choice.41
Additionally, although the Miranda opinion itself is long, the holding is
succinct:
The prosecution may not use statements, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the
use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination.
By custodial
interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into

Id.
Id. at 492–93 (comparing Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 512–13 (1963), and
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948) (Douglas, J.)).
41
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457.
39
40
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custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way.42
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned
that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he
does make may be used as evidence against him, and
that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either
retained or appointed. The defendant may waive
effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.43
The narrow five-to-four majority holding in Miranda set forth the
specific warnings that are to be given prior to custodial interrogation and
set the parameters for what was meant by “custodial interrogation.” In
reaffirming Escobedo, the Miranda majority began with the premise that
applying Fifth Amendment protections to in-custody interrogations was
“not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an application of
principles long recognized and applied in other settings.”44
As
evidenced in its opening paragraphs, the Miranda majority was
concerned with two interrelated concepts that it had addressed initially
in Escobedo. First, defendants in custodial interrogation, particularly
when faced with state law enforcement officials, were unaware of their
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.45 Second, the Court
appeared gravely concerned with the defendants’ lack of notice that they
were entitled to consult with an attorney during the custodial
interrogation process.46 Taken together, these two interrelated concerns
amounted to what the Court believed to be “pressure on the suspect
[that] must be eliminated,” even if that pressure is so subtle as to be
nothing more than the “influence of the atmosphere and
surroundings.”47
The Miranda majority took great pains to trace the history of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and demonstrate that its
application to custodial interrogations was rooted in the Constitution.
Indeed, it was held that “[i]n this Court, the privilege has consistently
been accorded a liberal construction,”48 and the application of the Fifth
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Id. at 444.
Id.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 439.
Id. at 440.
Id. at 512 (Clark, J., dissenting).
Id. at 461 (majority opinion).
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Amendment to in-custody questioning could be “taken as settled in
federal courts” as far back as 1897.49 The majority stated:
We are satisfied that all the principles embodied in the
privilege apply to informal compulsion exerted by lawenforcement officers during in-custody questioning. An
individual swept from familiar surroundings into police
custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and
subjected to techniques of persuasion . . . cannot be
otherwise than under compulsion to speak.50
Having satisfied itself that its procedural pronouncements were
governed by the Fifth Amendment, the Court turned to applying its
holding to state proceedings. “In Malloy, we squarely held the privilege
applicable to the States, and held that the substantive standards
underlying the privilege applied with full force to state court
proceedings.”51 The implications of that decision “were elaborated in
our decision in Escobedo . . . decided one week after Malloy applied the
privilege to the States.”52 Given these decisions, the Court concluded
that it was a natural progression to apply its procedural safeguards to
both federal and state law enforcement. Thus, the Miranda majority
concluded that:
Today, then, there can be no doubt that the Fifth
Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal
court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all
settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in
any significant way from being compelled to incriminate
themselves. . . . [W]ithout proper safeguards the process
of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or
accused of crime contains inherently compelling
pressures which work to undermine the individual’s
will to resist and to compel him to speak where he
would not otherwise do so freely.53
Although the Court was clear on what the minimum procedural
safeguards were to be for individuals taken for in-custody questioning,
the Miranda majority acknowledged that it could not:
49
50
51
52
53
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[S]ay that the Constitution necessarily requires
adherence to any particular solution for the inherent
compulsions of the interrogation process as it is
presently conducted. Our decision in no way creates a
constitutional straightjacket which will handicap sound
efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this effect.
We encourage Congress and the States to continue their
laudable search for increasingly effective ways of
protecting the rights of the individual while promoting
efficient enforcement of our criminal laws.54
What the Miranda Court sought to recognize, therefore, was that
with the changing scope and methods of law enforcement questioning,
“reliance on the traditional totality of the circumstances test raised a risk
of overlooking an involuntary custodial confession . . . a risk [that is]
unacceptably great when the confession is offered in the case in chief to
prove guilt.”55
C. The Response to Miranda
After reviewing the legal foundation upon which Miranda rests, it is
perhaps easier to understand why so many constitutional scholars
question the constitutional underpinnings of the Miranda warnings.
Certainly, following the Miranda decision, many across the country
believed that the Court had seriously undermined the ability of law
enforcement to protect the public from criminals. Many in Congress
believed that the Court had created a door through which scores of
criminals could avoid prosecution through technicalities, free to prey on
the lives of innocent citizens.56
The Miranda Court welcomed continued action by Congress and the
states in the area of confessions so long as the minimal requirements it
set forth were met.57 In direct response to Miranda, and as part of its
Id.
Id. at 457; see Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 442 (2000).
56
See Omnibus Crime Control And Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. (82 Stat. 197) 2123 (“[C]rime will not be effectively abated so long as criminals
who have voluntarily confessed their crimes are released on mere technicalities.”).
57
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. The Court stated:
We encourage Congress and the States to continue their laudable
search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the
individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws.
However, unless we are shown other procedures which are at least as
effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in
54
55
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omnibus crime control package, Congress passed legislation in 1968 in
contravention of the Miranda holding.58 Section 3501 of Title 18 of the
United States Code 59 was intended to return to the law enforcement
assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following
safeguards must be observed.
Id.
58
See Omnibus Crime Control And Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. (82 Stat. 197) 2137, 2138:
The committee is of the view that the legislation proposed in Section
701 of [T]itle II [18 U.S.C. § 3501] would be an effective way of
protecting the rights of the individual and would promote efficient
enforcement of our criminal laws. . . . [T]he overwhelming weight of
judicial opinion in this country is that the voluntariness test does not
offend the Constitution or deprive a defendant of any constitutional
right.
Id.
59
18 U.S.C. § 3501 states:
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the
District of Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof,
shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before such
confession is received in evidence, the trial judge shall, out of the
presence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the trial
judge determines that the confession was voluntarily made it shall be
admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall permit the jury to hear
relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct the
jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves
under all the circumstances.
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take
into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the
confession, including
(1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant
making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before
arraignment,
(2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which
he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the
confession,
(3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was
not required to make any statement and that any such statement could
be used against him,
(4) whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to
questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and
(5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of
counsel when questioned and when giving such confession.
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be
taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the
issue of voluntariness of the confession.
(c) In any criminal prosecution by the United States or by the District
of Columbia, a confession made or given by a person who is a
defendant therein, while such person was under arrest or other
detention in the custody of any law-enforcement officer or lawenforcement agency, shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay
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community the “totality of the circumstances” test, with voluntariness
being the deciding factor as to the admissibility of the defendant’s
confession at trial.60 Whether the defendant received his or her Miranda
warnings was only one factor to be considered by the court when
assessing admissibility of the confession; a direct reversal of the Court’s
holding in Miranda. According to § 3501, courts were to look at a nonexhaustive list of factors, including whether Miranda-type warnings
were given, the time elapsed between the arrest and arraignment, and
whether the defendant was aware of the charges being leveled against
him or her.61 In the view of Congress, Miranda was an aberration of
jurisprudence, and its legislative response marked a return to the proper
balance between the protection of the rights of the accused and the

in bringing such person before a magistrate judge or other officer
empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws
of the United States or of the District of Columbia if such confession is
found by the trial judge to have been made voluntarily and if the
weight to be given the confession is left to the jury and if such
confession was made or given by such person within six hours
immediately following his arrest or other detention: Provided, That the
time limitation contained in this subsection shall not apply in any case
in which the delay in bringing such person before such magistrate
judge or other officer beyond such six-hour period is found by the trial
judge to be reasonable considering the means of transportation and the
distance to be traveled to the nearest available such magistrate judge
or other officer.
(d) Nothing contained in this section shall bar the admission in
evidence of any confession made or given voluntarily by any person to
any other person without interrogation by anyone, or at any time at
which the person who made or gave such confession was not under
arrest or other detention.
(e) As used in this section, the term “confession” means any confession
of guilt of any criminal offense or any self-incriminating statement
made or given orally or in writing.
18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000).
60
See Omnibus Crime Control And Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. (82 Stat. 197) 2123 (stating that “there is a need for legislation to offset the
harmful effects of the Court decisions mentioned above,” including Miranda); Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 436 (2000). In Dickerson, the Court stated:
Given § 3501’s express designation of voluntariness as the touchstone
of admissibility, its omission of any warning requirement, and the
instruction for trial courts to consider a nonexclusive list of factors
relevant to the circumstances of a confession, we agree with the Court
of Appeals that Congress intended by its enactment to overrule
Miranda.
530 U.S. at 436.
61
See 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b)(1)–(5) (setting forth factors judges were to consider when
weighing admissibility of confession).
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promotion of efficient enforcement of criminal law.62 “[The totality of
the circumstances] approach to the balancing of the rights of society and
the rights of the individual served us well over the years,” and it is
constitutional.63
Section 3501 remained relatively dormant for thirty years while
federal and state law enforcement implemented the warnings required
by Miranda.64 Despite dire warnings that Miranda’s requirements would
bring law enforcement efforts to a halt, prosecutors simply did not rely
on § 3501.65 However, in 1999, a panel of the Fourth Circuit applied
§ 3501 and ruled it permissible to use voluntary confessions taken in
violation of Miranda requirements in federal court proceedings. In
United States v. Dickerson,66 the Supreme Court examined the question of
whether the Miranda Court announced a constitutional rule or merely
exercised its supervisory authority to regulate evidence in the absence of
congressional direction:67
Given § 3501’s express designation of voluntariness as
the touchstone of admissibility, its omission of any
warning requirement, and the instruction for trial courts
to consider a nonexclusive list of factors relevant to the
circumstances of a confession, we agree with the Court
of Appeals that Congress intended by its enactment to
overrule Miranda.68
If Congress has such authority, § 3501’s totality of the circumstances
approach must prevail over Miranda’s requirement of warnings; if not,

62
Omnibus Crime Control And Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. (82 Stat. 197) 2137 (1968).
63
Id.
64
See Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward a Workable Test
for Identifying Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 465, 511 (2005) (“[Section 3501]
was largely ignored by federal prosecutors. Thus, the Miranda warnings requirement
remained intact simply by default.”); see also Brooke B. Grona, Casenote, United States v.
Dickerson, Leaving Miranda and Finding a Deserted Statute, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 367 (1999)
(“[Section 3501] has not been used by the Government to challenge confessions, and it has
not been considered by courts as a replacement for the Miranda warnings.”).
65
Contrary to concerns cited by Congress that Miranda would demoralize law
enforcement and “lessen their effectiveness in combating crime,” Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. (82 Stat. 197) 2128
(1968), law enforcement adapted to Miranda and its requirements and continued to garner
voluntary confessions from criminals.
66
530 U.S. 428 (2000).
67
Id. at 437.
68
Id.at 436.
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that section must yield to Miranda’s more specific requirements.69
However, the Supreme Court went on to hold that Congress “may not
legislatively supersede [the Court’s] decisions interpreting and applying
the Constitution”; therefore, the case turned on whether “the Miranda
court announced a constitutional rule or merely exercised its supervisory
authority to regulate evidence in the absence of congressional
direction.”70
Despite the fact that in the intervening years the Supreme Court had
created several significant exceptions to Miranda’s warnings
requirement71 and that it frequently referred to them as merely
“prophylactic” and “not themselves rights protected by the
Constitution,”72 in Dickerson, the Court concluded that Miranda is a
constitutional decision.73 No constitutional rule is immutable, and the
sort of refinements made by such cases is merely a normal part of
constitutional law.74
The Dickerson Court based its holding on two factors. First, the
Court considered Miranda’s application to the states, stating that the
Court does not hold “supervisory power over the courts of the several
States” but “is limited to enforcing the commands of the United States
Constitution.”75 Thus, Miranda’s application to the states indicates that it
is a constitutional rule, not merely a federal judicial rule of evidence or
Id. at 437.
Id.
71
See id. (citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984)). In Quarles, the Supreme
Court articulated a “public safety” exception to application of Miranda warnings. 467 U.S.
at 655. Under Quarles, the Supreme Court concluded that although the defendant clearly
was in custody when questioned about the location of a firearm prior to receiving his
Miranda warnings, “[w]e conclude that the need for answers to questions in a situation
posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting
the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.” Id. at 657.
72
See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 438 (citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)).
73
Id.
74
Id. at 441 (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985)). In Elstad, the Court carved
one of the many exceptions to Miranda by holding that a voluntary confession obtained
prior to delivery of Miranda warnings did not taint a subsequent confession. Elstad, 470
U.S. at 318. The Seibert Court stated:
In Elstad, it was not unreasonable to see the occasion for questioning at
the station house as presenting a markedly different experience from
the short conversation at home; since a reasonable person in the
suspect’s shoes could have seen the station house questioning as a new
and distinct experience, the Miranda warnings could have made sense
as presenting a genuine choice whether to follow up on the earlier
admission.
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 615–16 (2004).
75
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 438.
69
70
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procedure. Second, the Court relied on the principle of stare decisis to
decline to overrule Miranda. Finding no persuasive force that would
require departure from precedent, the Court explained: “Miranda has
become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the
warnings have become part of our national culture.”76 Also, as Justice
Scalia has noted, wide acceptance in the legal culture “is adequate reason
not to overrule” a particular holding.77 Thus, the Court concluded that
Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress could not
supersede legislatively.
III. SEIBERT: ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO CIRCUMVENT MIRANDA
Case law since Miranda generally has boiled down the rule on
custodial interrogations and confessions as such:
[F]ailure to give the prescribed warnings and obtain a
waiver of rights before custodial questioning generally
requires exclusion of any statements obtained.
Conversely, giving the warnings and getting a waiver
has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility;
maintaining that a statement is involuntary even though
given after warnings and voluntary waiver of rights
requires unusual stamina, and litigation over
voluntariness tends to end with the finding of a valid
waiver.78
However, Miranda continues to be tested by law enforcement in an
effort to secure confessions while paying homage to the mere letters of
its holding. In 2004, the Supreme Court decided Missouri v. Seibert,79
which involved a mid-stream application of the Miranda warnings after
law enforcement had begun questioning the defendant and she had
confessed.80 The issue before the Court was the constitutionality of what
was called the “question-first” method. This law enforcement tactic was
being adopted by many as a way to circumvent some of the strictures
placed on law enforcement by Miranda.

Id. at 443.
Id. at 444 (citing Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 331–32 (1999)).
78
Seibert, 542 U.S. at 608–09 (“[C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable
argument that a self-incriminating statement was ‘compelled’ despite the fact that the law
enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.”) (citing Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433, n.20 (1984)).
79
542 U.S. 600 (2004).
80
Id. at 604–05.
76
77
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The “question-first” method was an interpretation of Miranda that
allowed law enforcement to ask questions of the subject, then Mirandize
the subject after gaining the information or confession, and immediately
resubmit the questions, all in a relatively seamless manner.81 Therefore,
in Seibert, the issue for the Court was whether a post-Miranda confession
was admissible in light of the near continuous interrogation under which
it was obtained.82
The Court has had little trouble identifying
circumstances in which it believed the “important objectives” of law
enforcement outweighed and did not “compromise Miranda’s central
concerns.”83
But “[t]he technique of interrogating in successive,
unwarned and warned phases raises a new challenge to Miranda.”84 The
object of “question-first” is to render Miranda warnings ineffective
because officers wait for a particularly opportune time to give the
warnings or until after the suspect has already confessed.85
Under “question-first” analysis, the issue becomes whether the
warnings function effectively as Miranda requires and it is a fact-specific
analysis in many ways.86 The Court determined that question-first, in so
far as the facts presented in Seibert were concerned, did not fall into the
acceptable category of Miranda exclusions:
Strategists dedicated to draining the substance out of
Miranda cannot accomplish by training instructions what
81
See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 611. (“The upshot of all this advice is a question-first practice of
some popularity, as one can see from the reported cases describing its use, sometimes in
conformance with departmental policy.”).
82
Id. at 606–07.
83
Id. at 619 (citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)).
84
Seibert, 542 U.S. at 609.
85
Id. at 611.
86
Id. at 616. The Court discussed the differences between the facts in Seibert and those
that permitted a confession obtained without Miranda warnings to come in under Elstad
and articulated circumstances to be considered when judging the effectiveness of the
Miranda warnings:
The contrast between Elstad and this case reveals a series of relevant
facts that bear on whether Miranda warnings delivered midstream
could be effective enough to accomplish their object: the completeness
and detail of the questions and answers in the first round of
interrogation, the overlapping content of the two statements, the
timing and setting of the first and the second, the continuity of police
personnel, and the degree to which the interrogator’s questions treated
the second round as continuous with the first.
Id. at 615. It is important to note that the Court was not applying a “fruits test” to the
analysis although the “analytical underpinnings of [a fruits approach and that adopted in
Seibert for Miranda considerations] function similarly in practice.” Id. at 624 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting). The two approaches are “entirely distinct,” as illustrated by the Court in the
Patane decision. Id.
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Dickerson held Congress could not do by statute. Because
the question-first tactic effectively threatens to thwart
Miranda’s purpose of reducing the risk that a coerced
confession would be admitted, and because the facts
here do not reasonably support a conclusion that the
warnings given could have served their purpose,
Seibert’s postwarning statements are inadmissible.87
IV. WHAT IS THE STATUS OF MIRANDA TODAY?
Even with the Court’s reaffirmation of Miranda’s constitutional
underpinnings in Dickerson and Seibert, placing Miranda within the rubric
of constitutional analysis is difficult. Clearly, the Miranda Court
expected the warnings it articulated in Miranda would safeguard Fifth
Amendment protections against self-incrimination, but only by a bare
majority. Perhaps it is true that the Court’s Miranda holding “is neither
compelled nor even strongly suggested by the language of the Fifth
Amendment,” and the decision amounted to judicially-created law and
public policy, as suggested by Justice White in his dissent.88
It may be that in the post-Miranda world in which law enforcement
operates today, the true test of the admissibility of a confession is not the
administration of Miranda warnings, but whether the confession was
“voluntarily” given pursuant to due process.89 Still others suggest that
the true constitutional underpinnings for Miranda are found within the
Fourth or Sixth Amendments. Perhaps Miranda is really nothing more
than a “prophylactic rule”90 to ensure that the penumbra of rights
guaranteed by the Constitution is protected in criminal proceedings and
should be limited in its application and scope.91 The Court certainly will
continue to carve out exceptions to Miranda’s application to custodial
interrogations leading to confessions as our community evolves and new
situations present themselves to law enforcement.

Seibert, 542 U.S. at 617 (majority opinion).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 531 (1966) (White, J., dissenting).
89
See, e.g., Paul Marcus, It’s Not Just About Miranda, Determining the Voluntariness of
Confessions in Criminal Prosecutions, 40 VAL. L. REV. 601 (2006) (noting that voluntariness
considerations remain a major matter in criminal prosecutions).
90
See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 636 (2004) (“[T]he Miranda rule is a
prophylactic employed to protect against violations of the Self-Incrimination Clause. . . .
The Miranda rule is not a code of police conduct, and police do not violate the Constitution
(or even the Miranda rule, for that matter) by mere failures to warn.”).
91
Id. at 636–37.
87
88
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However, I posit that at the end of the day, it does not matter
whether Miranda is a Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendment case. It does not
matter how one categorizes Miranda; what matters is what it
accomplishes. The warnings that evolved out of Miranda are not “but a
‘form of words’”92 to be pigeon-holed into a particular area of
jurisprudence, they are the embodiment of the beliefs in this country that
everyone has rights that must not be curtailed, no matter how laudable
the goal. Miranda’s warnings and their effects simply sweep more
broadly than any one area of jurisprudence.93
Miranda and its warnings maintain the balance between law
enforcement and the public at large. The warnings serve to remind both
sides of law enforcement that this country is based on individual rights
that cannot be overridden—no matter how noble the cause. Perhaps this
is a bit strident, but the fundamental fact remains that Miranda warnings
are designed to ensure that citizens are both aware of their rights and
they are given the opportunity to waive those rights in an informed
manner. As the Miranda majority stated, the warning that an individual
has the right to remain silent and that anything she says may be used as
evidence against her serves “to make the individual more acutely aware
that he or she is faced with a phase of the adversary system—that he is
not in the presence of persons acting solely in his interest.”94
As Justice Clark noted in his partial concurrence in Miranda,
“detection and solution of crime is, at best, a difficult and arduous task
requiring determination and persistence on the part of all responsible
officers charged with the duty of law enforcement.”95
But the
arduousness of the task cannot run roughshod over the rights of the
citizenry, and that is what Miranda stands for today. Whether it is a Fifth
Amendment protection against self-incrimination, or as Justice Clark
suggested, a due process issue, the warnings set forth in Miranda serve to
level the playing field and ensure that law enforcement bears the burden
of doing its job and the citizenry is protected against overbearance.
Miranda’s warnings are not merely “talismanic incantations” that
somehow miraculously grant the aura of constitutionality to the fruits of

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385,
392 (1920)).
93
See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 623 (2004) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing
the body of case law acknowledging that Miranda “serves the Fifth Amendment and
sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself”).
94
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469.
95
Id. at 502 (Clark, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
92
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law enforcement’s efforts;96 rather, they serve as a shorthand reminder
that all of us may play on the same field under the same set of rules and
if we choose not to do so, we do so knowingly.
For the most part, when law enforcement officials approach an
individual during a criminal inquiry, they rely on two things. First, they
count on the human tendency to cooperate and appear willing to
succumb to authority. There is a reason why law enforcement personnel,
such as state troopers, appear to be such an imposing figure when they
approach a civilian during a traffic stop. Their uniforms and badges give
an air of authority; an authority that most of society are trained to obey.
Second, officers rely upon a civilian’s lack of understanding about his or
her rights during a criminal inquiry.97 While we can all probably cite the
Miranda warnings in our sleep thanks to popular television and books,
law enforcement counts on the fact that a combination of human desire
to cooperate and uncertainty about the process as a whole will confuse a
suspect and result in an admission beneficial to law enforcement.98
The modern day interrogation environment is meant to subject the
suspect to the will of the examiner, and thus the potential for compulsion
is evident.99 In the interrogator’s office, “the investigator possesses all
the advantages. The atmosphere suggests the invincibility of the forces
of the law.”100 Thus, even in his Miranda dissent, Justice Harlan
recognized that the “more important premise [at issue in Miranda] is that
pressure on the suspect must be eliminated though it be only the subtle
influence of the atmosphere and surroundings” in which an individual

See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 612 (citing California v. Prycock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981)).
Police manuals in use at the time Miranda was decided emphasized this point by
encouraging law enforcement to remove a suspect from his or her home because in the
home environment “he may be confident, indignant, or recalcitrant. He is more keenly
aware of his rights and more reluctant to tell of his indiscretions or criminal behavior
within the walls of his home. Moreover his family and other friends are nearby, their
presence lending moral support.” Id. at 449–50.
98
As the Miranda majority noted, “the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy
toll on individual liberty, and trades on the weakness of individuals.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at
455.
99
This fact certainly was not lost on the Miranda majority. “[C]oercion can be mental as
well as physical, and [] the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an
unconstitutional inquisition.” Id. at 448 (citing Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206
(1960)). The Court noted that police manuals of the day stressed that interrogations should
take place “in private,” noting that “the ‘principal psychological factor contributing to a
successful interrogation is privacy—being alone with the person under interrogation.’” Id.
at 449 (citing FRED INBAU & JOHN REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 1
(Williams & Wilkins Co. 1962).
100
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 450.
96
97
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finds herself being interrogated.101 Unless adequate protective devices
are employed, no statement can truly be free of choice.102 This is why the
Seibert majority found that question-first, in the circumstances presented,
was constitutionally unacceptable.
The warnings, when given
midstream in a virtually continuous interrogation, did not reasonably
convey to the suspect her rights as required by Miranda.103
What Miranda warnings were designed to do, and what this Article
suggests the Seibert Court emphasized they were intended to accomplish,
is to strike a balance between law enforcement and the criminal suspect
that gives the suspect, or any ordinary citizen, a moment to consider the
rights bestowed upon them by the Constitution and make an informed
decision about whether to waive those rights. One can argue that Justice
Harlan was incorrect when he stated that the Miranda majority “has not
and cannot make the powerful showing that its new rules are plainly
desirable in the context of our society, something which is surely
demanded before those rules are engrafted onto the Constitution and
imposed on every state and county in the land.”104
Arguably, society demanded at the time of Miranda, and continues to
demand, the very procedural safeguards set forth in Miranda and the
breathing room they provide criminal suspects. Our history is replete
with evidence of law enforcement’s efforts to press, pressure, and push
citizens to gather the confession that can close a case.
It is
understandable, and to some degree warranted, that police questioning
“may inherently entail some pressure on the suspect and may seek
advantage in his ignorance or weaknesses.”105 But there must be
balance. There must be assurance that the average citizen will not be so
intimidated, so threatened that in order to remove oneself from the
situation that she signs away her constitutional rights and confesses
involuntarily. That is not the bedrock upon which this country is built.
As the Escobedo Court so eloquently stated:
We have also learned the companion lesson of history
that no system of criminal justice can, or should, survive
if it comes to depend for its continued effectiveness on
the citizens’ abdication through unawareness of their
Id. at 512.
Id. at 458.
103
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 611 (2004) (citing Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195,
203 (1989)).
104
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 515 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
105
Id.
101
102
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constitutional rights. No system worth preserving
should have to fear that if an accused is permitted to
consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and
exercise, these rights. If the exercise of constitutional
rights will thwart the effectiveness of a system of law
enforcement, then there is something very wrong with
that system. 106
Perhaps Miranda’s warnings “do nothing to contain the policeman
who is prepared to lie from the start,”107 but they do ensure that a
suspect’s confession is knowingly given. “Society has always paid a stiff
price for law and order, and peaceful interrogations is not one of the dark
moments of the law,”108 but involuntary confessions coerced from
defendants are not peaceful. Right or wrong, Miranda “interrogations
undertaken pursuant to proper Miranda warnings are presumed
noncoercive; interrogations without such warnings are presumed
coercive.”109 If the public understands the subtle distinction afforded
them by the recitation of Miranda’s warnings, then we are all better off.
“The Miranda rule has become an important and accepted element of
the criminal justice system.”110 Ultimately, Miranda did not result in a
lack of confessions. The law enforcement community has not crumbled
under its weight. Law enforcement retains the ability under Miranda and
its progeny to conduct investigations, question potential suspects, and
even to get them to confess. Miranda simply ensures that when an
individual is deprived of her liberty in any way or taken into custody for
questioning, certain safeguards are in place so that when a confession is
obtained, that confession is admissible. Miranda and its application have
not remained static. The Court continues to allow it to evolve and adapt
so that the compelling interests of law enforcement and the individual
may remain in balance. Miranda’s fundamental holding remains sound
forty years later, and this Article suggests that it will remain vital for
years to come.

106
107
108
109
110
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